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Prejudicial and Discreditable Military
Conduct: A Critical Appraisal
of the General Article
By JAMES K. GAYNOR*
M OST of the articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice can be
explained to a soldier or a sailor in relatively simple terms without un-
due difficulty.1 Article 134, however, is so broad in scope that a
proper explanation would require, in effect, an explanation of hundreds
of judicial decisions. The reason? This article, commonly called the
general article, denounces substantially three broad offenses. It pro-
vides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, [1] all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces [2] all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and [3] crimes and offenses not capital, of which per-
sons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance
of by a general, special or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the dis-
cretion of that court.2
This language covers more than seventy rather diverse offenses.
The United States Supreme Court has said that a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.'
* Dean, The Cleveland State University College of Law B.S., J.D., Indiana
University; LL.M., S.J.D., The George Washington University; Colonel, United States
Army, Retired.
1. UNIFORM CODE OF MirrrARy JUsTICE art. 137 [hereinafter cited as UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. § 937 (1964) provides that each enlisted member of the military service
shall have explained to him, within 6 days after he enters upon active duty, various
specified articles pertaining to the administration of justice in the military service
plus all of the punitive articles. This explanation must be repeated after 6 months,
and again upon each reenlistment. These requirements are unique to the military
service. Persons in all other ways of life are presumed to know both the state
and federal laws which govern their conduct without any requirement that those laws
be explained to him.
2. UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
3. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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Yet the validity of article 134 and its predecessors has been sustained in
enough cases that any further attack on it would seem futile.' Similar
provisions have been in existence since the beginning of the Republic
and even before; but they received very little critical attention in the
law journals-at least until the past two decades. Some of the writers
who have discussed article 134 have been severe.' One of them termed it
a study in vagueness; 6 another called it elemental confusion.7  None
have attempted to place the general article within its proper perspective.
I. Historical Development
Almost two thousand years ago a law of Arrius Meander in the
Roman Digests provided that: "Every disorder to the prejudice of gen-
eral discipline is a military offense, such as, for instance, the offense of
laziness, or insolence, or idleness." The Articles of War of Gustavus
Adolphus of Sweden, issued in 1621, made punishable whatever was
not contained therein but was repugnant to military discipline.' The
British Articles of War of 1765 made punishable crimes not capital and
those disorders or neglects to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline that were not mentioned in the other articles.' °
The American Articles of War dated 1775 adopted the British
provision with only a minor change in wording." Substantially the
same language was used by the Congress in 180612 and in the revision
of 1874.13 A subsequent revision added "all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the military service."'4 Since that addition in 1916,
4. All pertinent cases are discussed in Wiener, Are the General Military Arti-
cles Unconstitutionally Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J. 357 (1968).
5. Note, Constitutional Law-Uniform Code of Military Justice-General Arti-
cle Void for Vagueness?, 34 NEB. L. REV. 518 (1955); Nichols, The Devil's Article, 22
MILITARY L. REV. 111 (1963). An excellent analysis of the article is in an editorial
note, Peltzer, The Military Crime of Prejudicial Conduct: An Appraisal of United
States v. Messenger, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 76 (1953).
6. Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Study in Vague-
ness, 37 N. CAR. L. REv. 142 (1959).
7. Hagan, The General Article-Elemental Confusion, 10 MILITARY L. RFv. 60
(1960).
8. DIGEST, XLIX, § 16, at 6.
9. W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 914 (War Dep't reprint,
1920) [hereinafter cited as WINTHROP].
10. Id. at 946.
11. Id. at 957. Only one word was changed in the corresponding provision of
the Articles of War adopted by the Continental Congress on Sept. 20, 1776. Id. at 971.
12. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 371.
13. The old provision was renumbered as article 62. Rev. Stat. § 1342 (1874).
14. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666. It was said in the
Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1 446 (1917) that the principal reason for
[Vol. 22
MILITARY CONDUCT AND ARTICLE 134
article 134 has remained substantially unchanged.
The original Articles of War constituted the disciplinary code of the
Army-and later of the Air Force when it became a separate service in
1947. The Articles for the Government of the Navy had a similar pro-
vision: "All offenses committed by persons belonging to the Navy
which are not specified in the foregoing articles shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct."'15 With the adoption of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice in 1951, both articles were brought together to
form the present article 134. Thus, in its present form the article con-
sists of three parts: (1) conduct prejudicial to good order and disci-
pline, (2) conduct that would discredit the armed services, and (3)
crimes and offenses not capital.
H. Crimes and Offenses Not Capital
The third clause of article 134 may be considered entirely apart
from the first two clauses. Although it may not be readily apparent from
its wording, the clause has a definite meaning and is wholly independent
from "prejudice to good order and discipline" or "discredit to the
service."
"Crimes and offenses not capital" is defined in the Manual for
Courts-Martial as describing those acts or omissions, not otherwise
punished by the Uniform Code, that are denounced as crimes or of-
fenses by enactments of the Congress, or under the authority of the
Congress, and are triable in federal courts.16 Capital offenses are those
including this phrase was to make military offenses of activities of retired soldiers
which might bring discredit upon the service, such as the nonpayment of debts, but
with "a limited field for the application of this part of the general article to soldiers on
the active list."
15. Articles for the Government of the Navy, ch. 10, § 1624, art. 22, 18 Rev. Stat.
pt. 1, at 280 (1874), redesignated article 22(a) after a provision relating to fraudulent
enlistment was later added. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 212, 27 Stat. 716. The general
article of the Navy was article XXXII in the 1800 enactment, Act of Apr. 23, 1800,
ch. 33, art. XXXII, 2 Stat. 49 and article 8 in the 1862 revision, Act of July 17, 1862,
ch. 204, art. 8, 12 Stat. 603. The latter included the wording "but in no case shall
punishment by flogging be inflicted, nor shall any court-martial adjudge punishment
by flogging."
16. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES ff 213(e) (1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 MANUAL]. Winthrop said that crimes not capital were triable by court-
martial only if the conduct was to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.
WmNTHRoP, supra note 9, at 723-24. This view appears to have prevailed until the
revisions of the Articles of War in 1916.
Although the criminal provisions of federal law generally are in title 18 of the
United States Code, it was pointed out in Hall, Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Title
18 U.S. Code ad Other Federal Offenses, (Jan.-Feb. 1961) JAG J. (Navy) 3, that
federal crimes are defined in at least thirteen other titles. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7234
(1964), relating to the sale of improperly packaged butter.
January 19711
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for which a death sentence is authorized, even though not mandatory;
thus, it is improper to charge an offense as a violation of article 134
if the specification alleges facts which constitute a capital offense. 7
However, a violation of article 134 may be found as a lesser included of-
fense in a charge that alleges a capital offense. For example, in a
charge of murder, the lesser included offense of negligent homicide
may be properly punished as a violation of the general article.
18
A violation of state law is not an offense within the meaning of
the third clause (unless it also violates the Assimilative Crimes Act),"0
and neither is a violation of foreign law. -0  Of course, a violation of a
state or foreign law may be an offense under the first or second clause if
the conduct is either "prejudicial to good order and discipline" or "of a
nature to bring discredit upon the service. "21
The Assimilative Crimes Act provides that in those geographic
areas in the United States over which the federal government has exclu-
sive jurisdiction, the criminal law of the state in which the area is lo-
cated becomes the federal law.22 The act does not apply if the offense
is within the scope of some other criminal enactment of the Congress,
23
17. United States v. French, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 171, 27 C.M.R. 245 (1959); Rhodes,
28 C.M.R. 427, a/fd, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 735, 29 C.M.R. 551 (1960); WINTHROP, supra
note 9, at 721-22.
18. United States v. Benavides, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 226, 8 C.M.R. 26 (1953).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
20. 1969 MANUAL I 213(c); Hughes, 7 C.M.R. 803 (1953). However, in United
States v. Rubenstein, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 523, 22 C.M.R. 313 (1957), a conviction of,
inter alia, evading Japanese customs requirements was sustained although the court
did not discuss this offense.
21. See United States v. Grosso, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 566, 23 C.M.R. 30 (1957); Grose,
26 C.M.R. 740 (1958); Peterson, 16 C.M.R. 565, petition denied, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 740,
16 C.M.R. 292 (1954); Freeman, 15 C.M.R. 639, petition denied, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 734,
16 C.M.R. 292 (1954); Wolverton, 10 C.M.R. 641 (1953); Fox, 6 C.M.R. 533 (1952).
See also Hagan, The General Article-Elemental Confusion. 10 MILITARY L. REv. 60
(1960). This author suggests at 104-05 that proof of the existence of a local statute
may be of some value in showing the attitude of the local populace toward the commis-
sion of acts denounced as criminal. In United States v. Leach, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 388,
22 C.M.R. 178 (1956), it was said that reference to a state statute is surplusage. In
Deese, 3 C.M.R. (A.F.) 307 (1951) (ACM 2693), it was said that whether a violation
of foreign law constitutes conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the service is to
be determined by American standards rather than those of the place of the conduct.
Accord, Parkman, 4 C.M.R. (A.F.) 270 (1951) (ACM 3008). See note 52 infra.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). See generally United States v. Rowe, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
302, 32 C.M.R. 302 (1962); Waller, The Assimilative Crimes Act, 2 MILITARY L.
REV. 107 (1958).
23. Dunaway v. United States, 170 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1948). Although the
court specifically avoided the issue, it was intimated in Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit
Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944), that the act is inapplicable where state law is inconsistent
with valid Army regulations. In Fox, 6 C.M.R. 533 (1952), an accused was convicted
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and of course it does not apply in a trial by a court-martial if the con-
duct is otherwise a violation of military law. In addition to including
all elements of the state enactment, a specification relying on the act
must allege that it is applicable.24 And logically, it has been held that
the punishment for a conviction by court-martial cannot exceed that
authorized by the state law for a violation of its statute.25
A specification alleging a crime or offense not capital must include
all of the elements of the federal statute violated, 26 but it need not
identify the statute unless doing so would be necessary to properly un-
derstand the charge.27  Since a specification under article 134 need not
specify which of the three clauses was violated,28 an attempt to allege a
crime or offense not capital may be sustained in an appropriate case as
a violation of the first or second clause.29 Likewise, a court-martial may
find an accused guilty of a crime or offense not capital by substitution
when the specification alleges a violation of some article of the Uniform
Code other than the general article.3"
The punishment for a conviction under the third clause is limited
to that provided by the federal statute violated or to that of a similar
article in the Uniform Code. If conduct violates a specific article of the
Uniform Code, punishment for that conduct cannot be increased by
ignoring the specific article and charging it as a crime or offense not
capital under the general article.31
In past years, the number of convictions under the general article
for crimes or offenses not capital has been relatively small compared to
of usury in violation of a Texas statute but the conviction was set aside, the Board of
Review holding that the act was inapplicable because the Texas law was a civil remedial
statute rather than a criminal enactment.
24. Morris, 21 C.M.R. 477, petition denied, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 780, 22 C.M.R. 331
(1956).
25. United States v. Picotte, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 196, 30 C.M.R. 196 (1961).
26. United States v. Herndon, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 461, 4 C.M.R. 53 (1952).
27. United States v. Hogsett, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 681, 25 C.M.R. 185 (1958); Har-
baugh, 28 C.M.R. 711 (1959). In United States v. Dicario, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 353, 24
C.M.R. 163 (1957), the court said that failure to allege a mail-theft case as a violation
of the Federal Criminal Code indicated an intention to charge the military version of
the offense which is "distinct" from the federal statute.
28. United States v. Marker, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 3 C.M.R. 127 (1952).
29. United States v. Long, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60 (1952); United States
v. Herndon, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 461, 4 C.M.R. 53 (1952).
30. Rivers, 3 C.M.R. 564 (1951).
31. United States v. DeAngelo, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 35 C.M.R. 395 (1965);
United States v. White, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 31 C.M.R. 185 (1962); United States v.
Middleton, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 54, 30 C.M.R. 54 (1960); United States v. Cramer, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 221, 24 C.M.R. 31 (1957).
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the number of convictions under the first or second clause. Since it was
held in 1969 that a court-martial does not have jurisdiction of an act of
misconduct not directly connected with military duty in peacetime,3 2
it would appear that allegations under the third clause will be even
more limited, if not virtually eliminated in future times of peace.
III. The Breadth of Prejudicial
or Discreditable Conduct
Conduct that violates the first or second clause of article 134 is
either prejudicial to good order and discipline, or is of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces. As noted before in connection with
the third clause, the specification need not state which of these clauses
allegedly has been violated.3 The instructions to the court-martial
may be properly phrased in the alternative; that is, they may state that:
"Under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the preju-
dice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or it was of a na-
ture to bring discredit upon the armed forces."34
It has long been recognized that an irregular or improper act on
the part of a member of the military service can scarcely be conceived
which may not be regarded as prejudicing discipline in at least some in-
direct or remote sense, but the article has not been used to cover such
distant effects. Its scope has been limited to cases in which the preju-
dice was reasonably direct and palpable.3 5
Article 134 is not intended to set up a moral standard for the mili-
tary. An individual's private activities are considered outside the scope
of article 134 as long as the conduct does not interfere with the per-
32. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
33. United States v. Marker, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 3 C.M.R. 127 (1952). See note
25 & accompanying text supra.
34. In United States v. Darby, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 416, 26 C.M.R. 196 (1958), con-
victions were set aside for failure to instruct that prejudice to discipline or discredit to
the service was an element of the offense. Accord, United States v. Lawrence, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 732, 25 C.M.R. 236 (1958); United States v. Gittens, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 673,
25 C.M.R. 177 (1958); United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, 24 C.M.R. 135
(1957). But cf. United States v. Grimes, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 272, 26 C.M.R. 52 (1958),
where the accused entered a plea of guilty to assault and battery in a charge of assault
with intent to commit rape, it was held that it was not necessary to instruct that preju-
dice to discipline or discredit to the service was an element where the defense counsel
assented to instructions without this element.
35. United States v. Sadinsky, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 (1964); 1969
MANUAL 213(b); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 213a (1951); Manual
for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army 183a (1949); Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army
152a (1928).
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formance of military duties. And generally, the conduct must involve
persons other than the accused3
6 to constitute an offense.37
The purpose of the first clause of article 134 is to preserve disci-
pline; the purpose of the second clause is to maintain a good reputation
for the military services.3 8 Conduct which violates the second clause
must be of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces. Thus an
offense may be committed even though actual discredit to the service is
not shown.3 9  The criteria for identifying conduct that is of a.nature to
bring discredit upon the Armed Forces are undefined; however, the
courts-martial apparently are able to apply the criteria successfully on an
ad hoc basis. It has been said that the place of the conduct is immaterial
and that it may be committed in a private, civilian residence,40 but in
view of O'Callahan4" this would probably be true only in time of war.
IV. The Table of Maximum Punishments
The text of the Manual for Courts-Martial, the administrative reg-
ulations governing military discipline,42 discusses only fourteen types of
offenses which violate article 134.43 More than forty others are listed
in the Table of Maximum Punishments, 44 a table promulgated by the
President pursuant to article 56 of the Uniform Code.45 The table is a
listing of maximum punishments for violations of the general article,
specific articles, and lesser included offenses. Of course, such a
36. United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952).
37. In United States v. Kirchner, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 477, 478, 4 C.M.R. 69, 70 (1952),
the court said that article 134 "must be interpreted in the light of existing customs and
usages."
38. 1969 MANuAL f 213(c). In United States v. Cummins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 26
C.M.R. 449 (1958), it was held that a conviction of dishonorable failure to pay a debt
cannot be sustained where the creditor has testified that he was satisfied with the conduct
of the debtor.
39. United States v. Bluel, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 27 C.M.R. 141 (1958); United
States v. Thompson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 620, 14 C.M.R. 38 (1954); cf. United States v.
Waluski, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 724, 21 C.M.R. 46 (1956).
40. United States v. Lowe, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 654, 16 C.M.R. 228 (1954). The court
said the gravamen of the offense "is not the locus as such, but the discrediting cir-
cumstances." Id. at 658, 16 C.M.R. at 228.
41. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). Drug offenses are still consid-
ered service-related.
42. Exec. Order No. 11476, 34 Fed. Reg. 12937 (1969).
43. 1969 MANuAL 213(f) (1969).
44. Id. q 127(c). The Table of Maximum Punishments was first adopted in 1891.
Previously, examples of conduct which resulted in convictions under the general article
had been given by Colonel William Winthrop in his great work, Military Law and Prece-
dents, the last edition of which was published in 1896. It still is considered by
many to be the greatest work on military law which has ever been produced.
45. UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1964).
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listing is not exclusive; an act need not be listed in the table to be an
offense under the general article.46
As early as 1896 Winthrop listed more than a hundred different
types of conduct which had resulted in convictions under the general
article.47 Some of the more unusual were: (1) being offensively un-
clean in person, (2) lawless conduct by a soldier resulting in his civilian
conviction and confinement which deprived the Government of a con-
sinderable portion of his enlisted service, (3) a noncommissioned officer
engaging in a public sparring exhibition in a saloon, (4) introduction of
liquor into the Indian country, and (5) joining and parading with an
association of Fenians who were reported to be in armed hostility to a
nation at peace with the United States.4"
The Table of Maximum Punishments was first authorized during
Winthrop's time by the Act of September 27, 1890.11 Of course many of
the offenses under the general article later became the subjects of spe-
cific articles, such as assault, insubordination, and unauthorized ab-
sence from duty. Drunkenness was limited, at least in the original
table, to those who had been convicted of committing such offense
within 10 miles of station by a civilian court.
Additions to the offenses listed in the table under the general arti-
cle were made in 1905 and again in 1910, but they were of minor conse-
quence. The table was completely revised in 1917 to list forty-nine
types of conduct as violations of the general article. By 1928 the num-
ber was reduced to thirty-seven due to amending legislation which had
made some types of conduct, such as sodomy and abandoning guard, a
violation of other specific articles. Additional changes were made in
1949 and again in 1951. The table included in the current Manual for
Courts-Martial, effective in 1969, deleted more than a half-dozen of-
fenses under the general article while nine were added and the wording
of several others was changed. 50 Notwithstanding the additions and
deletions to the table of the types of conduct that violate the general
article, there are still many offenses not listed that are punishable under
article 134.
46. In United States v. Holt, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 621, 23 C.M.R. 81, 85 (1957),
the court said that the list in the table is "illustrative" rather than restrictive. See text
accompanying note 180 infra.
47. WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 730 n.75 (1st ed. printed 1896).
48. Id. at 726-32.
49. Act of Sept. 27, 1890, ch. 998, 26 Stat. 491.
50. Offenses under the general article are listed alphabetically in the table, thus
the first offense listed is abusing a public animal. No reported case of a conviction of
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The elements of each of the offenses listed in the table are found by
referring to an appendix of the Manual for Courts-Martial which gives
the recommended wording of specifications or allegations.51  The ap-
pendix, however, does not adequately explain the meaning of discredit-
able or prejudicial conduct under the general article. An explanation
of such conduct can only be obtained by referring to the decided cases.52
In order to show the scope of the general article this writer has grouped
those cases providing significant military precedent into seven con-
venient categories. In all the cases the conduct charged was held to
have violated article 134.
V. The Scope of the General Article
The seven categories into which cases brought under the general
article fall are: (1) assault and battery, (2) conduct of an indecent
nature, (3) illicit sexual relations, (4) dishonorable conduct, (5)
various forms of fraud, (6) drunkenness and disorderly conduct, and
(7) all other offenses. The seventh group includes negligent homi-
cide, fleeing the scene of an accident, disloyal statements, unlaw-
ful entry, offenses involving the mail, impersonation, communicating a
threat, improper discharge of firearms, and such minor acts as com-
mitting a nuisance and appearing in an unclean uniform.
A. Assault under the General Article
The first seven words of article 134 are words of limitation.5 3
Conduct cannot be punished as a violation of the general article if it is a
this particular offense has been found in the present century, but Winthrop cited fif-
teen such convictions between 1865 and 1893. WiNTHoP, supra note 9, at 726-32.
51. 1969 MANUAL app. 6(c).
52. Since the United States Court of Military Appeals was established in
1951 as the supreme court of the military judicial system, it has published more than
eighteen volumes of its decisions. These, and the decisions of the Courts of Military
Review-the intermediate appellate body in the court-martial system which was known
as the Board of Review prior to the 1968 amendments to the Uniform Code-are re-
ported in a series entitled Court-Martial Reports, averaging about two volumes a year
since the Uniform Code became effective.
Before then, the Army published Digests of Opinions of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral-volumes were issued in 1912 and in 1940-and opinions of Army Boards of Re-
view, eighty-one volumes between 1929 and 1949, forty-nine for overseas areas during
World War II, and eleven volumes which included opinions of the Judicial Council
from 1949 until the Uniform Code became effective. The Navy published Court-Mar-
tial Orders, which discussed the important features of selected cases, and the Air
Force, during its short existence before the Uniform Code became effective, published
four volumes of Court-Martial Reports. These volumes are cited C.M.R. (A.F.) to
distinguish them from the current series of Court-Martial Reports.
53. See United States v. Hallett, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 378, 15 C.M.R. 378 (1954).
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violation of some other article. 54 (Military law has been consistent in
this respect since the time of Winthrop.) 55 But this then raises an initial
question about the case of an assault which may be a violation of article
128.56 Simple assault under article 128 is punished by maximum con-
finement and forfeiture of pay for 3 months, but there are nine types of
aggravation listed in the table under this article.57 Commission of the
most serious, the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm, is sub-
ject to a maximum punishment of dishonorable discharge and confine-
ment for 5 years.
The court was more severe in the case of assault upon a com-
missioned officer not in the execution of his office. It reasoned that a
greater punishment than that provided for simple assault was permitted
prior to enactment of the Uniform Code, and that there was no indica-
tion that Congress intended to change the situation so that article 128
would preempt such assault offenses. 58
Later, the court sustained a conviction under the general article of
assault upon a person in the execution of police duties.59 In this case,
the court held that the Uniform Code empowers the President to pre-
scribe maximum limits of punishment; he may, therefore, properly pro-
vide greater punishment for misconduct aggravated by special circum-
stances, whether the allegation is under article 128 or the general ar-
ticle."
Most of the assault offenses, including assault consummated by a
battery on a child under 16 years of age, are now listed in the table un-
der article 128, yet there remain four assault offenses listed under the
general article. One of these, assault with intent to commit murder or
rape, is subject to a maximum punishment of dishonorable discharge
and confinement for 20 years. Perhaps these assault offenses should
more properly have been listed under article 128 in the latest revision of
the code.
54. Convictions under article 134 were sustained as violative of other punitive
articles in United States v. Thorpe, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 705, 26 C.M.R. 485 (1958) (false
official statement under article 107), and United States v. O'Neil, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 416, 12
C.M.R. 172 (1953) (desertion under article 85).
55. WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 725, quoted with approval in Carter v. Mc-
Claughry, 183 U.S. 365, 397 (1902).
56. 10 U.S.C. § 928 (1964).
57. 1969 MANUAL 213(f)(1).
58. United States v. Toutges, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 425, 32 C.M.R. 425 (1963).
59. UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1964).
60. United States v. Ragan, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963).
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B. Indecent Conduct
Five types of indecent conduct are listed as a violation of the gen-
eral article: (1) indecent acts with a child under 16 years, (2) indecent
exposure, (3) indecent language communicated to a female over 16
years of age, (4) indecent language communicated to any child under
16 years of age, and (5) indecent acts with another.61  These offenses
are quite serious. A dishonorable discharge is authorized for any of
these offenses except the second, indecent exposure; furthermore, as
much as 7 years of confinement may be adjudged for the first, indecent
acts with a child under 16 years of age.
These offenses are malum in se, and instead of including them
under article 134, they should be specifically denounced. One wonders
why such conduct must be "prejudicial to good order and military
discipline" or "of a nature to bring discredit upon the service."
In the case of an indecent act with a child under 16 years of age,
the act must be done "with the specific intent of arousing, appealing to,
or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires, either of the person
committing the act, or of the child, or of both. '6 s  It may involve, for
example, a verbal communication accompanied by gestures,63 or merely
the use of indecent language.6 The conduct, however, must be in the
actual presence of the victim; consequently, communicating indecent
language by telephone will not suffice.6 5 This distinction seems to be
unnecessarily subtle.
Indecent exposure is the intentional exposure of the body in a place
open to public view in a manner calculated to shock feelings of chastity
or to corrupt morals. Since wrongful intent is an element, the offense
is not committed if the exposure is by negligence or accident. 66 In one
61. 1969 MANuml, app. 6(c), A6-23.
62. Id. 213(f) (3); accord, United States v. Nastro, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 22 C.M.R.
163 (1956). In United States v. Sakaye, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 680, 29 C.M.R. 496 (1960),
it was said that this intent may be inherent in the act of a male who fondles a female
victim and places his hands upon her body. In United States v. Singletary, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 146, 33 C.M.R. 358 (1963), the accused said he inserted his finger into the
private parts of a female child with whom he was babysitting to determine the extent
of injuries she received from a fall. The court said that this would constitute a defense
if believed by the court-martial.
63. E.g., Daniel, 26 C.M.R. 894, petition denied, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 666, 27 C.M.R.
512 (1958); Johnson, 35 C.M.R. 587, petition denied, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 685, 35 C.M.R.
478 (1965) (the indecency consisted of holding a child and attempting to kiss her).
64. E.g., Childers, 31 C.M.R. 747, petition denied, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 686, 32 C.M.R.
472 (1962); Rifle, 25 C.M.R. 650, petition denied, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 813, 25 C.M.R. 486
(1957).
65. United States v. Knowles, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 404, 35 C.M.R. 376 (1965).
66. United States v. Conrad, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 439, 35 C.M.R. 411 (1965); United
States v. Manos, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 734, 25 C.M.R. 238 (1958).
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case a conviction was sustained where the exposure occurred in an au-
tomobile capable of being seen by the public, even though the automo-
bile was parked in a secluded place.67
In the communication of indecent language, the test is whether
the language "is calculated to corrupt morals or excite libidinous
thoughts" rather than whether the words used are obscene.68  The in-
tent to arouse passions or sexual desires is not necessary to constitute
the offense of an indecent act with another.69 An "indecent" act is re-
quired, but in this connection "indecent" means indecency as the
term ordinarily is used. Thus, the offense was not committed by two
men sleeping in the same bed while clad in their underwear when no
other evidence of indecency was present.70  Actual touching is not nec-
essary, thus a conviction was sustained where one male made indecent
movements in regard to his person toward another. 71
The five types of indecent conduct listed in the table and discussed
above are not exclusive. Convictions have been sustained under the
general article for association with known sexual deviates, 72 and for
voyeurism, commonly known as window peeping;73 but it was held that
the mere possession of obscene pictures did not violate the general
article.
74
C. Illicit Sexual Relations
Among the sex offenses listed in the table under the general article
are adultery, bigamy, pandering, and wrongful cohabitation.75 Adul-
tery is defined in military law as "sexual intercourse between a man and
67. Fletcher, 23 C.M.R. 911 (1956).
68. Choleva, 33 C.M.R. 599 (1963); Beauregard, 31 C.M.R. 680, petition denied,
12 U.S.C.M.A. 767, 31 C.M.R. 314 (1962); Simmons, 27 C.M.R. 654, petition denied,
10 U.S.C.M.A. 679, 27 C.M.R. 512 (1959). As to evidence obtained from telephone
monitoring, see United States v. Gopaulsingh, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 772, 19 C.M.R. 68 (1955).
69. United States v. Nastro, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 22 C.M.R. 163 (1956).
70. Bradford, 16 B.R. (Army) 317 (C.M. 228799) (1943); accord, Munson
17 B.R. (Army) 139 (1943) (C.M. 229412). In Moore, 33 C.M.R. 667 (1963), a
finding that an accused committed an indecent act by attempting to mark upon the ex-
posed buttocks of another person who was being forcibly restrained was held to con-
stitute no more than an assault.
71. United States v. Johnson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 499, 22 C.M.R. 289 (1957).
72. United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958).
73. Clark, 22 C.M.R. 888, petition denied, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 790, 22 C.M.R. 331
(1956). In Manos, 24 C.M.R. 626, rev'd on other grounds, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 734, 25
C.M.R. 238 1957, a conviction of window peeping was sustained even though there
was no evidence that anyone was in the room or that the accused saw anything.
74. Schneider, 27 C.M.R. 566 (1958).
75. 1969 MANUAL app. 6(c), art. 134.
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woman, one of whom is lawfully married to a third person.' ' 76 In one
case a conviction of adultery was set aside because the necessary dis-
creditable circumstances were not shown by the evidence. 77 In this
connection it should be noted that the husband-wife privilege as a rule
of evidence applies where adultery is charged.
78
Bigamy, as in civilian jurisdictions, is entering into a marriage while
validly married to another.79 It has been held that belief in the dissolu-
tion of a prior marriage is a defense if the belief is honest and reason-
able.80
Pandering is arranging for a female to have sexual intercourse with
another or to engage in prostitution for money."' One case states that
the offense does not require the expectation of financial gain.8"
The offense of wrongful cohabitation is committed when a man and
a woman live together, ostensibly in wedlock when, in fact, no such
marriage exists.8 ' In contrast to adultery, it is not necessary that either
of the parties be married to anyone or that there be evidence of sexual
intercourse.8 4 The offense involves a course of conduct rather than a
sojourn for a single night.8 5
Fornication, defined as sexual intercourse "involving mutual con-
76. Neville, 7 C.M.R. 180, 190, petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 670, 7 C.M.R. 84
(1952).
77. Walters, 11 C.M.R. 355, modified, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 16 C.M.R. 191 (1954).
78. United States v. Rener, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 65, 37 C.M.R. 329 (1967).
79. Guidry, 22 C.M.R. 615 (1956); Graves, 5 C.M.R. 582 (1952). In
United States v. Patrick, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 189, 7 C.M.R. 65 (1953), the court discussed
the presumptions of innocence and validity of the second marriage as opposed to the
presumption of continued life of the first spouse and concluded that a question of fact,
uncomplicated by presumptions, resulted.
80. United States v. Pruitt, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 438, 38 C.M.R. 236 (1968); United
States v. Bateman, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 88,23 C.M.R. 312 (1957); United States v. McCluskey,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 20 C.M.R. 261 (1955). In United States v. Bradshaw, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 146, 35 C.M.R. 118 (1964), it was said that annulment of a bigamous
marriage is not of itself a defense but is relevant to the issue of mistake.
81. United States v. Gentry, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 14, 23 C.M.R. 238 (1957) (merely
transporting others to a house of prostitution does not constitute pandering); cf.
United States v. Brown, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 255, 24 C.M.R. 65 (1957); United States v.
Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952).
82. Bohannon, 20 C.M.R. 870 (1955).
83. Grimstad, 35 B.R. (Army) 341 (1944) (C.M. 254122). In United States v.
Leach, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 388, 22 C.M.R. 178 (1956), it was said (with Quinn, C.J., dis-
senting) that it is not necessary to prove that the relationship was a matter of common
knowledge. As to the inference relating to marriage from cohabitation, see United
States v. Smith, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 405, 34 C.M.R. 185 (1964).
84. United States v. Melville, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 597, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958).
85. Moody, 12 B.R. (Army) 119 (1942) (C.M. 218647).
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sent by both parties" when neither of the parties is married,86 is a mili-
tary offense only when the circumstances are of a nature to bring dis-
credit upon the service.8 7 Such a showing may not be as difficult as it
might seem. When two soldiers had sexual intercourse with two females
in the presence of each other, each couple witnessed the act of the other.
This was held to be discreditable conduct.8
D. Dishonorable Conduct
There are two types of conduct listed in the table under article 134
which are denominated as "dishonorable": (1) making and uttering a
worthless check by dishonorably failing to maintain sufficient funds for
its payment, and (2) dishonorably failing to pay a just debt.8 9 Most
offenses involving worthless checks violate article 123a, an offense
added to the Uniform Code in 1961. 90 The conduct that violates the
general article is limited to a failure to maintain sufficient funds for pay-
ment of a check when such conduct amounts to gross indifference or
bad faith;"' more than simple negligence must be involved. 2 Thus,
a conviction could not be sustained where there was an honest belief
that funds would be on deposit at the time of presentment, and the be-
lief continued until presentment and dishonor even though the belief
was not reasonable. 3
The dishonorable failure to pay a just debt is an offense which
has no counterpart in the civilian community. It has been said that the
American concept of justice "has excluded the abhorrent practice of
imprisonment for debt. . . ."9 Yet the Court of Military Appeals has
sustained convictions of this traditional military offense. In one case,
86. Mosby, 23 C.M.R. 425, 430-31 (1957).
87. In United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 427, 4 C.M.R. 15, 19
(1952), the court indicated that fornication may be a military offense "if committed
under such conditions of publicity or scandal as to enter that area of conduct given
over to the police responsibility of the military establishment." Accord, Bums, 25
C.M.R. 791, petition denied, United States v. Harrington, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 812, 25 C.M.R.
486 (1958).
88. United States v. Berry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 20 C.M.R. 325 (1956).
89. 1969 MANUAL, app. 6(c) A6-21.
90. 10 U.S.C. § 923a (1964).
91. United States v. Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 20 C.M.R. 254 (1955); accord,
United States v. Stratton, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 28 C.M.R. 376 (1960).
92. United States v. Bullock, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 142, 30 C.M.R. 142 (1961).
93. United States v. Remele, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 33 C.M.R. 149 (1963). In
United States v. Richardson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 400, 35 C.M.R. 372 (1965), the fact
that the accused relied upon deposits of checks received for gambling debts, which
checks were dishonored, did not result in dishonorable conduct.
94. United States v. Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 559, 20 C.M.R. 272, 275 (1955).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
after observing that a civil suit is the remedy for debt in the civilian
community, the court said that such suits are seldom effective against
military personnel because of their transient nature:
Moreover, members of the military community-easily identifi-
able through the wearing of the uniform-are inevitably grouped in
the public mind as a class-with the result that a failure by one to
discharge monetary responsibilities tends to brand all not only as
criminal persons, but as poor credit risks as well, in the eyes of the
civilian population.9"
Like the bad check offenses, more than negligence must be involved
for the failure to pay a just debt to constitute an offense.96 There is no
offense as long as there is a bona fide dispute as to the existence of the
debt.97  One cannot be convicted if he in fact is unable to pay a debt
and there was no wrongful intent in incurring it.9s Of course, since the
requirement is that there must be discredit to the military service, an of-
fense is not committed simply because the debtor in a private commer-
cial transaction is discredited in the eyes of the creditor and his agents. 99
Something more is required. Thus, in Alexander °" the court found
that:
There is proof that the accused borrowed the money and failed to
pay, but there is no suggestion that he deceived the bank in getting
them to make the loan. He was not dealing with a child or an inex-
perienced person or one lacking business acumen and discretion.
95. Id. As to debts of military personnel see Murphy, The Soldier's Right to a
Private Life, 24 MILiTARY L. REv. 97, 111 (1964); Anderson, Indebtedness and Finan-
cial Discipline, USAF JAG BULL., July 1960, at 31.
96. United States v. Swanson, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 711, 26 C.M.R. 491 (1958) (dic-
tun). In United States v. Cummins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 26 C.M.R. 449 (1958), it
was said that failure to make any payment over a long period of time may tend to show
dishonorable conduct, but delay alone will not establish the offense.
97. 1969 MANUAL I 213(f)(7). In United States v. Webb, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 422,
27 C.M.R. 496 (1959), it was said that the accused's assertion that he "was upset" when
he signed an acknowledgment of indebtedness was not sufficient to make the debt a
disputed one so as to avoid prosecution. In Arndt, 7 B.R.-J.C. (Army) 229 (1950)
(C.M. 341921) it was said that there may be a conviction even though the facts are in
dispute, distinguishing such a dispute from a disputed debt.
98. United States v. Schneiderman, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 494, 31 C.M.R. 80 (1961);
White, 25 C.M.R. 733 (1958). Convictions were set aside in United States v. Cum-
mins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 26 C.M.R. 449 (1958) (manager of the creditor loan firm
testified that the accused's account was classified as satisfactory despite late payments);
Young, 12 C.M.R. 939, petition denied, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 721, 15 C.M.R. 431 (1954) (an
airman earning $60 per month was three months delinquent in paying installments on a
$180 note); Lamburth, 4 C.M.R. (A.F.) 737 (1951) (A.C.M. 3985) (an officer
was three and a half months delinquent in a grocery bill of $25.40); London, 8 B.R.-J.C.
(Army) 57 (1950) (C.M. 342392) (involved a debt to a small-loan company at a
high rate of interest where the creditor took no steps to collect by civil process).
99. White, 25 C.M.R. 733 (1958).
100. Alexander, 22 C.M.R. 740 (1956).
MILITARY CONDUCT AND ARTICLE 134Januar 19711
A commercial bank is fully competent to protect itself in making
loans. It dealt with the accused at arm's length. When it extended
credit to him, it assumed a known business risk. When the accused
failed to pay, it had a legal note to sue on, and indeed did sue him
civily.'
0 '
The court observed that "it is not a crime to be sued" and that remain-
ing in default for several months is not dishonorable unless the facts
"clearly show deliberate bad faith" reflecting wrongful intent.1"2
E. Various Forms of Fraud
One of the various forms of fraud that violates the general arti-
cle is bribery, the offer or gift of something valuable to a person for the
purpose of influencing his official duties. 10 3  Graft, the use of one's of-
ficial position to obtain something of value, also violates the general
article.' In either offense, the recipient must be a person in a position
that would apparently permit him to be influenced improperly, although
he may be unable to perform the act for which the payment is offered
or given.' An offer does not constitute bribery unless it is in terms
that can actually be accepted. Thus, a person who asked at the time of
his apprehension how much it would take to forget the matter was not
guilty of bribery.' 6
Soliciting and accepting funds from military subordinates is graft.' 0
One case even held that borrowing from a military subordinate is an of-
fense. This was in spite of the fact that the loan would have been
made despite the superior position of the borrower."0 I
Acceptance of gifts by one acting for the government, even though
freely given, may constitute graft. Where one defendant accepted gifts
of considerable value but asserted that they were not in return for any
specific consideration or favor, the Court of Military Appeals said it
"is naive in the extreme" to believe that gifts or favors of such nature
may be accepted "without kindling at least a spark of hope in the heart
101. Id. at 743.
102. Id.
103. Graalum, 19 C.M.R. 667, petition denied, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 813, 19 C.M.R.
413 (1955).
104. United States v. Cash, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 33 C.M.R. 308 (1963); United
States v. Alexander, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 12 C.M.R. 102 (1953). The former involved
acceptance of money by a finance clerk for making an advance payment, and the latter
involved acceptance of money for transporting a passenger in a government vehicle.
These are typical of the many convictions of graft which have been sustained.
105. Williams, 23 C.M.R. 868 (1957).
106. United States v. Morrison, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 525, 28 C.M.R. 91 (1959).
107. United States v. Wiley, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 449, 37 C.M.R. 69 (1966).
108. Mayne, 39 C.M.R. 628 (1968).
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of the giver." The public "regards the acceptance of gratuities by its
servants with grave suspicion;" thus, such activities must inevitably
bring discredit upon the military service.' 0 9 In another case where
the gifts were of very small value and were accepted according to a
Korean custom, it was held that no offense was committed."10
Other forms of fraud include the signing of a false record and the
making of a false statement; both are covered under article 107. Forg-
ery is a violation of article 123, and the making of a false claim, along
with other types of fraud, violates article 132. But offenses relating to
false passes or other military documents, and altering public records, are
listed as violations of article 134. These rather serious offenses under
the general article"' differ from forgery in that the latter is committed
only if the document has the apparent capability of operating to the
prejudice of another." 2
In spite of the range of analogous offenses under articles 107, 123,
and 132, much has remained within the purview of article 134. Thus,
convictions under the general article were sustained in the following
cases: the improper use of another's identification card," 3 the wrong-
ful possession of incomplete pass forms that could easily be completed," 4
and the possession of a false pass with knowledge of its falsity." 5 Other
convictions were sustained where the documents in question were: a
pass that was ambiguous because it showed the same date for arrival
and departure,"16 an identification card with an altered birth date,"' a
false vehicle-clearance form," 8 a false ration book," 9 and a leave
form containing an unauthorized insertion that permitted the use of
civilian clothing.' 20 On the other hand, convictions were set aside in
109. United States v. Marker, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 398, 3 C.M.R. 127, 132 (1952).
110. Lowry, 8 C.M.R. 344, petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 679, 8 C.M.R. 178
(1953).
111. If an intent to deceive is established, 3 years confinement at hard labor are
authorized. See United States v. Blue, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 550, 13 C.M.R. 106 (1953);
United States v. Karl, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 12 C.M.R. 183 (1953).
112. In Davis, 31 C.M.R. 469 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
125, 32 C.M.R. 125 (1962), the article 134 offense was distinguished from the offense
violative of 18 U.S.C. § 701 (1964).
113. Chism, 31 C.M.R. 421 (1961).
114. Holmes, 18 C.M.R. 599 (1955).
115. United States v. Burton, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 645, 33 C.M.R. 177 (1963).
116. Collier, 23 C.M.R. 560, petition denied, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 770, 24 C.M.R. 311
(1957).
117. Nugent, 33 C.M.R. 664 (1963).
118. Tomes, 9 C.M.R. 679 (1953).
119. United States v. Tamas, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 502, 20 C.M.R. 218 (1955).
120. United States v. Showalter, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 35 C.M.R. 382 (1965).
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the following cases: possession of an unsigned furlough certificate,1
2 '
possession of a pass after the accused had reported it lost and had ob-
tained another,12 2 and possession of genuine orders for an allegedly
wrongful purpose.' 3
The alteration of a military pay record 2 4 or of an application for
Army Emergency Relief has been held to be the alteration of public
records, and thus a violation of article 134.125 An altered sick slip
was held not to be a public record, however, since it was only for the
information of the commanding officer, not the public at large.'
20
F. Drunkenness and Disorderly Conduct
Various circumstances under which a person is considered drunk
or disorderly are listed in the Table of Maximum Punishments under
article 134. All are subject to relatively minor punishment.
The military services long have considered drunkenness as "any in-
toxication that is sufficient to sensibly impair the rational and full exer-
cise of the mental and physical faculties, whether caused by liquor or
drugs."'127 In approving this definition, the Court of Military Appeals
said: If the accused's conduct is not such as to create the impression
within the minds of observers that he is unable "to act like a normal ra-
tional person," there can be no sensible impairment of his faculties. If,
because of intoxicating liquors, there was a perceptible lessening of
accused's ability to act like a normal rational person, then it may be said
that accused's faculties were sensibly impaired.'
28
Drinking liquor with a prisoner is listed in the table as a violation of
the general article; and in this case, it need not be to the extent of caus-
ing intoxication. In one of the few reported cases, the accused was
convicted of drinking with a prisoner of war.
129
To violate article 134, disorderly conduct must be something less
than riot or breach of the peace, offenses which are violations of arti-
121. Harmon, 40 B.R. (Army) 45 (1944) (C.M. 260877).
122. Kayes, 11 C.M.R. 878 (1953).
123. Hunter, 8 C.M.R. 770 (1953).
124. Owens, 25 C.M.R. 596 (1958).
125. Houle, 15 C.M.R. 521, petition withdrawn, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 748, 17 C.M.R.
381 (1954).
126. Young, 21 C.M.R. 431 (1956).
127. 1969 MANUAL 191; Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 191 (1951);
Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army 173 (1949); Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S.
Army 145 (1928); Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army 435 (1917).
128. United States v. Bull, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 635, 638, 14 C.M.R. 53, 56 (1954);
accord, United States v. Straub, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 30 C.M.R. 156 (1961).
129. Houck, 31 B.R. (Army) 61 (1944) (C.M. 247878).
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cle 116. Some of the various descriptions of "disorderly" have referred
to it as conduct which tends to disturb the public peace and decorum,
to scandalize the community, or to shock the public sense of morality;...
or as conduct which is of such a nature as to affect the peace and quiet
of persons who may witness it and be disturbed or provoked to resent-
ment by it;13 ' or conduct constituting an unaggravated type of breach
of the peace, such as shouting or making loud noises during the hours
normally reserved for rest by the more conservative elements of so-
ciety.'13 2 Examples include the use of obscene language in a cafe,"'33
kicking the door of a hotel room, 34 blowing an automobile horn on a
military post late at night,135 and improper remarks made by an officer
to an enlisted man and his female companion.
136
The punishment for being disorderly under such circumstances as
to bring discredit upon the military service is not limited to disturbances
of a contentious nature. In the case of some conduct not listed in the
Table of Maximum Punishments, it has been held that the punishment
prescribed for being disorderly under discreditable circumstances was
applicable. Such conduct has been referred to as a disorder, a general
disorder, or more commonly, a simple disorder. Examples are pos-
session of a false pass or ration book without proof of an intent to de-
ceive,' 37 and acceptance of money for the issuance of a pass where graft
could not be established because the official position of the accused
was not alleged. 3 '
G. Other Offenses Violative of the General Article
Negligent homicide, an unlawful killing resulting from simple neg-
ligence, 3 9 is generally not an offense in civilian jurisdictions except
130. McMillin, 22 B.R. (Army) 115 (1943) (C.M. 235557).
131. Powers, 5 C.M.R. 206 (1952), citing State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229
N.W. 311 (1930); accord, McGlone, 18 C.M.R. 525 (1955).
132. Burrow, 26 C.M.R. 761 (1958).
133. Reid, 36 B.R. (Army) 391 (1944) (C.M. 257015).
134. Brennan, 24 B.R. (Army) 149 (1943) (C.M. 238048).
135. Bethard, 12 B.R. (Army) 67 (1941) (C.M. 218415).
136. Loney, 8 C.M.R. 533 (1952), petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 678, 8 C.M.R.
178 (1953). In Grubb, 20 B.R. (Army) 213 (1943) (C.M. 423008), it was said that
abusive language is not a disorder if it results from unwarranted provocation.
137. United States v. Tamas, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 502, 20 C.M.R. 218 (1955); United
States v. Blue, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 550, 13 C.M.R. 106 (1953). In Reid, 18 C.M.R. 341
(1955), it was held that wrongful use of another's gasoline credit card was not analo-
gous to wrongful use of another's pass with intent to defraud but nevertheless was a
disorder in violation of the general article.
138. Williams, 23 C.M.R. 868 (1957).
139. United States v. Russell, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 696, 14 C.M.R. 114 (1954). For a
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those having automobile homicide statutes. In military law the offense
includes, but is not limited to, homicide by a motor vehicle. It may also
be committed by careless use of a weapon or other instrumentality. 4 '
Here, the requirement of simple negligence should not be confused
with the more stringent culpable negligence required for involuntary
manslaughter.
Fleeing from the scene of an accident is a rather common statutory
offense in civilian jurisdictions. In military law it "has long been con-
sidered of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces."141
When a vehicle strikes a person or collides with another vehicle or any-
thing else, the driver has a duty to stop immediately, make his identity
known, and give assistance to anyone who is injured. 1 2  The collision
need not be with a moving vehicle; the duty is the same if a vehicle
strikes a parked car.'1
3
Uttering disloyal statements that tend to undermine discipline and
loyalty is conduct of a treasonable nature, although treason, as such,
is not included in the Uniform Code as an offense. Proof that a dis-
loyal statement was deposited in the mail and addressed to another is
sufficient to establish that it was uttered, 14 and failure to accomplish the
intended purpose is not a defense.' 45 The conviction under article 134
of an enlisted man who said, "Captain, you're no damned good and the
Coast Guard is no damned good," was set aside because, although it
may have constituted disrespect (article 89), it was not a disloyal state-
ment.14 6
Housebreaking in violation of article 130 is an unauthorized break-
ing and entry into a building or structure with an intent to commit a
criminal offense therein. Lacking such an intent, unlawful entry is a
general discussion, see Munster & Larkin, Negligent Homicide in Military Law, 46
CALIF. L. REV. 782 (1958); Stevens, Manslaughter and Negligent Homicide, USAF
JAG J., Feb. 1957, at 15; 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641 (1953).
140. E.g., United States v. Kirchner, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 477, 4 C.M.R. 69 (1952)
(shooting at another with a pistol); Diaz, 12 C.M.R. 593 (1953) (firing a weapon while
clearing it in an unsafe manner); Fletcher, 13 C.M.R. 165 (1953) (careless discharge
of a firearm while hunting); White, 7 C.M.R. 448 (1953) (detonation of a grenade
thought to have been inactivated).
141. United States v. Eagleson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 685, 690, 14 C.M.R. 103, 108
(1954).
142. United States v. Russell, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 696, 14 C.M.R. 114 (1954).
143. Hicks, 13 B.R. (Army) 219 (1942) (C.M. 221686).
144. Wassner, 43 B.R. (Army) 189 (1945) (C.M. 266244).
145. McQuaid, 5 C.M.R. 525, petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 666, 5 C.M.R. 130
(1952).
146. Gustafson, 5 C.M.R. 360 (1952) (conviction of a separate charge of dis-
respect to an officer was sustained).
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violation of the general article.147  It is not necessary that there be a
breaking, or that the place entered be a building or structure, as re-
quired in the offense of housebreaking.148  A tent,149 a barbed-wire
enclosure,50 and a railroad car' 1 are places subject to unlawful en-
try, but oddly enough an automobile 52 or an aircraft 53 are not. -
The wrongful possession of marijuana or habit-forming drugs ap-
parently was not a problem in the military service prior to World War I,
nor was it mentioned in the early editions of the Manual for Courts-
Martial. However, on March 11, 1918, a general order issued by the
War Department provided that possession "of any habit-forming drug
not ordered by a medical officer of the Army" was prejudicial to disci-
pline or discreditable conduct, and thus "possession" became a violation
of the general article.' 54 The offense does not include possession of in-
struments which may be used to administer habit-forming drugs, 55 but
if a military commander issues an order prohibiting such possession, a
failure to obey the order may violate article 92.156
Perjury is a violation of article 131 but "statutory" perjury, subor-
nation of perjury, and false swearing are listed as violative of article 134.
147. Williams, 4 C.M.R. 801 (1952); Washington, 3 C.M.R. 503 (1952).
148. See United States v. Gillin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 25 C.M.R. 173 (1958).
149. United States v. Love, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 260, 15 C.M.R. 260 (1954).
150. Esposito, 21 C.M.R. 406, petition denied, United States v. Reil, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
771, 22 C.M.R. 331 (1956).
151. United States v. Hall, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 374, 30 C.M.R. 374 (1961). In Hol-
lings, 31 C.M.R. 358 (1961), it was said that the "Queen Bee Refreshment Center"
described an enclosure which could be the subject of unlawful entry.
152. United States v. Gillin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 25 C.M.R. 173 (1958).
153. United States v. Taylor, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 30 C.M.R. 44 (1960).
154. Gen. Order No. 25. Failure to pay a transfer tax in obtaining marijuana
violates 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (1964). This provision was discussed in United
States v. Blair, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 27 C.M.R. 235 (1959). As to the illegal import
of narcotics, see 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964); as to the illegal export, see 21 U.S.C. § 182
(1964). The applicability to military personnel of the federal law which makes it
illegal for a drug addict to leave the United States without registration is discussed in
Cooper, Does 18 U.S.C. 1407 Apply to Convictions by Courts-Martial for Narcotics
Offenses?, USAF JAG BULL., Nov. 1959, at 26. In United States v. LeBlanc, No. 22,
770 (U.S.C.M.A. April 17, 1970), the court held that a court-martial could not try
smuggling of marijuana into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176(a)
(1964) because the prohibition "entails the exercise of governmental powers different
from the regulation of the armed forces."
155. Lefort, 15 C.M.R. 596 (1954).
156. E.g., United States v. Washington, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 313, 26 C.M.R. 93 (1958);
United States v. Meadows, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 21 C.M.R. 178 (1956). In United
States v. West, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 34 C.M.R. 449 (1964), a pharmacist took narcotics to
his barracks and asserted it was for the purpose of safeguarding them. It was said
that he; may have been guilty of a violation of article 92 but not of article 134.,
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These violations of the general article are serious offenses and a punitive
discharge is an authorized punishment. "Statutory" perjury refers to
title 18 of the United States Code which defines perjury as a falsifica-
tion under circumstances in which federal law authorizes that an oath be
given. 5 ' Article 131 is much narrower as it is limited to falsification in
a judicial proceeding or in the course of justice.
One who makes an oral or written statement under lawful oath,
knowing the statement to be false, is guilty of false swearing. 58 False
swearing may be, for example, a false sworn statement to an administra-
tive board or investigator. 59
As in perjury, proof of two contradictory statements is insufficient
to prove false swearing. 60 Further, like perjury, corroboration is re-
quired.' 61 The common law rule requires the testimony of two inde-
pendent witnesses, but in military practice the testimony of one witness
will suffice if it is supported by other evidence.' 62 An unintentional
falsehood will not constitute the offense, 63 nor will a statement which is
technically true, although misleading.16 4  A falsification under oath will
establish a prima facie cause, but since wrongful intent must be estab-
lished, an effort in good faith to correct a false statement may show an
absence of wrongful intent. 6 5
157. A criminal penalty is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1964) for false testi-
mony under oath "before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which
a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered." A false statement
in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency, made knowingly,
is made punishable by 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964). E.g., Harbaugh, 28 C.M.R. 711
(1959) (false statement at a pretrial investigation).
158. 1969 MANUAL 213(f)(4). In United States v. Smith, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 236,
237, 26 C.M.R. 16, 17 (1958), the court discussed the difference between perjury and
false swearing, and said that perjury "requires that the false statement be made in a
judicial proceeding and be material to the issue, whereas these matters are not part of
the offense of false swearing."
159. United States v. Claypool, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 302, 27 C.M.R. 376 (1959)
(falsification to a military criminal investigator); United States v. Gomes, 3 U.S.C.M.A.
232, 11 C.M.R. 232 (1953) (falsification to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation); Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323 (1952), ajj'd, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 433, 9 C.M.R. 63 (1953)
(falsification to an Inspector General). In Cox, 26 C.M.R. 582 (1958), it was held
that the maximum is that provided for a violation of article 107 (false official state-
ment).
160. Reed, 9 C.M.R. 163 (1953); Evans, 4 C.M.R. 369 (1952).
161. 1969 MANUAL f 210, 213(f)(4).
162. United States v. Walker, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 158, 19 C.M.R. 284 (1955) (circum-
stantial evidence).
163. In United States v. Doctor, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 126, 21 C.M.R. 252 (1956), the
court said that the elements of false swearing, as in article 107 relating to false official
statements, include knowledge of the falsity and an intent to deceive.
164. United States v. Purgess, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 565, 33 C.M.R. 97 (1963).
165. Parrish, 21 C.M.R. 639 (1955), afI'd, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 22 C.M.R. 127
(1956).
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Subornation of perjury is inducing another to commit perjury'
6 6
and it has been held that there can be no conviction of subornation if
the alleged perjurer is acquitted.167  Among the related offenses which
have resulted in convictions have been soliciting another to refuse to
testify, 168 intimidating a witness,1 69 assaulting a witness for having testi-
fied,1 7 0 and telling another to remain quiet if questioned during an in-
vestigation.Y
71
Escape from confinement is a violation of article 95, but escape
from correctional custody, breach of correctional custody, violation of
parole, and breaking restriction are listed in the Table of Maximum Pun-
ishments as violations of the general article. Escape from or breach of
correctional custody1 72 has the same maximum authorized punishment
as escape from confinement-i year in confinement and a dishonor-
able discharge.
Violation of parole and breach of restriction are relatively minor
offenses. A bad-conduct discharge and confinement for 6 months
are authorized for the former, and confinement for 1 month for the
latter. The term "parole" has been defined as an authorized offer of
freedom from restraint under specified conditions and the acceptance of
the offer by the person being freed from restraint. 7 3  A person cannot
be placed on parole against his will. He must voluntarily accept the con-
ditions of the parole, 74 and this can occur only upon a release from cus-
tody or confinement. 75  Restriction, on the other hand, is strictly a
punitive measure; thus, a restriction to ensure an individual's presence
166. Procuring another to commit perjury is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1622
(1964). Threatening or endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in
any court of the United States or any court officer, or injuring a person or his prop-
erty for having attended or testified in a judicial proceeding, is a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503 (1964).
167. United States v. Doughty, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 540, 34 C.M.R. 320 (1964).
168. United States v. Wysong, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 26 C.M.R. 29 (1958); cf.
Zimmek, 23 C.M.R. 714 (1956) (solicitation to make a false official statement).
169. Rossi, 13 C.M.R. 896 (1953).
170. United States v. Long, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60 (1952).
171. McNeil, 48 B.R. (Army) 287 (1945) (C.M. 276298).
172. The concept of correctional custody did not become a part of military law
until the amendment of article 15. 76 Stat. 447 (1962). Under this legislation, a
commander is authorized to place an enlisted person in custody for a maximum of 30
days without trial by court-martial and without the stigma of a conviction appearing
on the individual's record.
173. Aiken, 16 C.M.R. 612 (1954); Thompson, 6 C.M.R. 573 (1952).
174. Rigney, 6 C.M.R. 736 (1952).
175. In Pickle, 30 C.M.R. 468 (1960), it was said that a conditional release from
pretrial confinement constitutes a restriction rather than parole.
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for duty is illegal.'
76
A recent addition to the scope of article 134 is obstructing justice,
an offense included in the table with the latest revision. Along with
refusal to certify, obstructing justice is punished by confinement for up
to 5 years. This penalty is considerably more serious than contempt of
court, article 48, which may be punished by confinement for 30 days
and a fine of $100. A person cannot be required to testify if he invokes
his privilege against self-incrimination provided by article 31, although
he may be compelled to testify if the possibility of incrimination is pre-
cluded, e.g., by a grant of immunity.177
Misprision of felony is defined as concealing knowledge of the ac-
tual commission of a felony by another and failing to make the facts
known to civil or military authorities.' Knowledge alone, however,
is insufficient; there must be an affirmative act of concealment. 7 '
Concealment of a misdemeanor, however, is probably excluded.'
Larceny is a violation of article 121, but receiving stolen property
and obtaining services under false pretenses are listed under the general
article. The latter was first included in the table in the latest revision.
In all three cases, the maximum authorized punishment depends upon
the value involved. Receiving stolen property is a more serious offense
than accessory after the fact in violation of article 78. Although a per-
son cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property which he has
stolen, he may be convicted of the offense even though he was a statu-
tory principal in the larceny.' 8 This seems to be anomalous, but the
situation has not been clarified by later decisions.
Communicating a threat, a rather common offense within the
general article, is punished by 3 years confinement. A threat is an
avowed, present determination or intention to injure another presently
or in the future. 82 It must be made known to the victim and it must be
apparent from its language that the threatened act is wrongful.'83 The
176. United States v. Gentle, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 37 C.M.R. 57 (1966).
177. United States v. Kirsch, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964).
178. Such conduct also is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
179. Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939); Assey, 9 C.M.R. 732
(1953).
180. See Maclin, 27 C.M.R. 590 (C.M. 400358) (1958), where the value of the
goods was pertinent to whether a felony had been committed.
181. United States v. Ford, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 30 C.M.R. 3 (1960).
182. United States v. Jenkins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 381, 26 C.M.R. 161 (1958); United
States v. Sturmer, I U.S.C.M.A. 17, 1 C.M.R. 17 (1951). Use of the mails to
communicate a threat is violative of 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
183. United States v. Humphrys, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 306, 22 C.M.R. 96 (1956); cf.
United States v. Sulima, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 630, 29 C.M.R. 446 (1960); United States v.
Mawhinney, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 350,29 C.M.R. 166 (1960).
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communication may be either oral or written, 84 and it may be com-
municated indirectly to the person threatened. 185  The prospect of ac-
tual physical injury is not required; any kind of injury is sufficient, such
as an injury to reputation.' 86  Nor must there be a present ability to
carry out the threat, so long as there is a possibility that it can be carried
out in the future. 8 7  It may also be conditional if there is a possibility
that the condition may happen, 88 but it must be more than idle talk or
jesting.1
8 9
The various offenses relating to the mail which are violations of
the general article-taking, opening, abstracting, secreting, destroying,
stealing, or obstructing-involve cases in which the mail is in those "mil-
itary channels which do not operate under the Post Office Depart-
ment." 90  The gravamen of the offense is the interference with the
sanctity of the mails.' 9 ' It is difficult to imagine an act more likely to
be prejudicial to good order and military discipline than interference
with the prompt delivery of the mail. Nevertheless, obstruction of the
184. Fishwick, 25 C.M.R. 897 (1958) (dictum).
185. United States v. Gilluly, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 458, 32 C.M.R. 458 (1963); O'Neal,
26 C.M.R. 924, petition denied, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 668, 27 C.M.R. 512 (1958). Cf.
United States v. Rutherford, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 461, 16 C.M.R. 35 (1954).
186. United States v. Frayer, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 600, 29 C.M.R. 416 (1960) (threat
to accuse a person falsely); Day, 4 C.M.R. 278 (1952) (threat to a Japanese girl to
close her cabaret). In United States v. Jenkins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 381, 26 C.M.R. 161
(1958), it was said that an invitation to engage in a fight does not necessarily con-
stitute a threat. In Conway, 33 C.M.R. 903, petition denied, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 682, 33
C.M.R. 436 (1963), it was held that a threat to injure the unborn child of a pregnant
woman was a threat to the woman herself. In Campion, 20 C.M.R. 537 (1955), it
was said that a threat must be directed to another person so does not include a threat
of suicide.
187. United States v. Sturmer, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 1 C.M.R. 17 (1951).
188. Douglas, 9 C.M.R. 619 (1953) (dictum).
189. United States v. Humphrys, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 306, 22 C.M.R. 96 (1956). Cf.
United States v. Gilluly, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 458, 32 C.M.R. 458 (1963).
190. United States v. Lorenzen, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 512, 515, 20 C.M.R. 228, 231
(1955) (dictum). In United States v. Dicario, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 353, 24 C.M.R. 163
(1957), it was said that the military version of a mail offense is distinct from a viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1964). Of course, if the mail were still in the custody of
the Post Office Department, the same conduct would be chargeable under the third
clause of article 134.
191. United States v. Lorenzen, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 512, 20 C.M.R. 228 (1955). In
United States v. Ray, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 20 C.M.R. 314 (1956), a conviction of opening
and secreting the package of another was reversed because it was not alleged that it
was "mail matter." In United States v. Peoples, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 22 C.M.R. 324
(1957), it was said that matter is in the mail from the time it is deposited in a receptacle
for the deposit of mail. In Wygas, 18 C.M.R. 576 (ACM 9578), petition withdrawn,
5 U.S.C.M.A. 865, 19 C.M.R. 413 (1955), it was said that decoy letters may be mail
matter.
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mail requires a specific intent to achieve an unlawful purpose; conse-
quently, mere inability to process the mail expeditiously does not con-
stitute an offense.
192
The common law crime of solicitation is a violation of the general
article,193 except for those offenses specifically prohibited by article 82,
i.e., solicitation to desert, to mutiny, to misbehave before the enemy, or
to commit an act of sedition. The Table of Maximum Punishments pro-
vides that the punishment for solicitation is the same as that which would
be authorized for commission of the principal offense, but no confine-
ment shall be longer than 5 years.
In addition to those offenses discussed above, and some which
have been omitted,194 there are still many other types of conduct which
are not listed in the Table of Maximum Punishments but which are still
192. United States v. Heagy, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 492, 38 C.M.R. 290 (1968).
193. E.g., United States v. Goodnight, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 542, 26 C.M.R. 322 (1958)
(soliciting a subordinate to disobey a regulation prohibiting the seeking of contributions
for the benefit of a superior); United States v. Haveriland, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 621, 25 C.M.R.
125 (1958) (soliciting another to violate a regulation); United States v. Walker, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 38, 23 C.M.R. 262 (1957) (soliciting another to commit sodomy and an
indecent act); United States v. Oakley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 733, 23 C.M.R. 197 (1957)
(soliciting another to procure poison to poison a sergeant).
194. The offenses included in the table under the general article in the latest re-
vision, not previously discussed, authorizing confinement are: burning with intent to
defraud (although arson long has been a violation of article 126), unlawfully trans-
porting a vehicle or aircraft in interstate or foreign commerce (somewhat an exten-
sion of the offense violative of title 18 of the United States Code), and criminal libel.
Offenses authorizing a punitive discharge are: circumstances that would endanger
life, and the unauthorized carrying of a concealed weapon. Offenses which may be
considered minor, because the maximum confinement authorized is 6 months or less,
are: wearing unauthorized insignia, breaking medical quarantine, gambling by a non-
commissioned officer with a subordinate, permitting a prisoner to do an unauthorized
act, committing a nuisance, straggling, offenses by or against sentinels, and having an
unclean uniform or unclean military equipment.
It is provided in the 1969 MANUAL 127(c)(I) that if an offense is not listed in the
table, the maximum punishment for it shall be that provided for the most closely-related
offense listed, or the lesser of them if it is closely related to more than one listed
offense. It then is provided that if there is no closely related offense listed, the maxi-
mum shall be that provided for similar conduct by the United States Code or the Code
of the District of Columbia, Id., 127(c)(1).
This may be rather difficult to explain to the enlisted member of the service, in
giving the explanation required by article 137. See note 1 supra.
The Court of Military Appeals has, to some extent, limited the application of this
provision. In more than one case, it has found that if no other provision was applicable,
the maximum punishment should be that provided for a simple disorder. E.g.,
United States v. Melville, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 597, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958); United States v.
Walker, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 38, 23 C.M.R. 262 (1957); United States v. Tamas, 6 U.S.C.M.A.
502, 20 C.M.R. 218 (1955); United States v. Blue, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 550, 13 C.M.R. 106
(1953).
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prohibited by the general article. A partial list of convictions sustained
on review include: obtaining telephone services with an intent to de-
fraud in the placing of a long-distance call,' 95 cruelty to members of
one's own family, 9 6 communicating a false, defamatory statement about
another person,117 having a female in military quarters while the ac-
cused was on duty,198 kidnapping, 19 and the unlawful conversion of an-
other's property. The last offense was defined as dealing with the
property of another in a manner contrary to the rights of the owner.
20 0
Considerably fewer cases have held that the defendant's conduct
did not violate the general article. These include cases of: one who,
without authority, removed two fuses from an electric fuse box;20 a
soldier who took a female to a military reservation and failed to remove
her from the post until an early morning hour;202 and a male airman
who was found in an enlisted day room for female personnel at an early
morning hour.20 3
VI. Improper Conduct by Officers
Officers traditionally have been held to a higher standard of con-
duct than enlisted personnel. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman is prohibited by article 133 and has been a military offense
since the time of the American Revolution. Until 1949, the punish-
ment was mandatory dismissal from the service.20 4 The offense re-
195. United States v. Herndon, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 510, 36 C.M.R. 8 (1965).
196. Francis, 12 C.M.R. 695, petition denied, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 837, 13 C.M.R. 142
(1953).
197. United States v. Brown, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 368, 30 C.M.R. 368 (1961), a case
which arose before criminal libel was included in the table as an article. 134 violation in
the 1969 MA uAL.
198. Cole, 30 C.M.R. 755 (1961).
199. United States v. Charlton, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 141, 39 C.M.R. 141 (1969);
United States v. Jackson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 580, 38 C.M.R. 378 (1968).
200. United States v. Matoka, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 608, 37 C.M.R. 228 (1967).
201. Davis, 27 C.M.R. 908 (1958).
202. Hibbard, 12 C.M.R. 492 (1953).
203. Smart, 12 C.M.R. 826 (1953). This decision turned on the fact that there
was no long-standing custom of the service which would prohibit such conduct.
204. The British Articles of War of 1765 provided discharge from the service
for behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner such as is unbecoming the character
of an officer and a gentleman, and this language was used in the Articles of War
adopted by the American Colonies in 1775 and revised in 1776. The following
language was used in the revision of 1806: "Any commissioned officer convicted before
a general court-martial of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, shall be
dismissed from the service." Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 369. The same
language was used in article 61 adopted in 1916, but with cadets included along with
officers. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, art. 95, 39 Stat. 666.
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mained serious after the 1951 amendments to the code. The code pro-
vides that "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be
punished as a court-martial shall direct.1
25
The great similarity between this article and the general article
has not gone unnoticed. The Court of Military Appeals has said it
"may be that a different standard applies if an officer is charged under
Article 133" than in the case of an allegation against either an officer
or an enlisted person under article 134. The court, however, had
"some misgivings about a principle which stamps an act criminal if
committed by an officer but innocent when perpetrated by an enlisted
man.
2 0 6
Nonetheless, it still appears that an officer convicted of a violation
of article 134 may be sentenced to dismissal from the service when for
the same conduct a punitive discharge would not be authorized for his
enlisted counterpart. The court approved the provision of the Manual
for Courts-Martial20 7 which authorizes dismissal from the service as
punishment for any violation of military law by an officer. 208
A type of conduct by an officer which may be prejudicial to good
order and military discipline under article 134 is social fraternization
with enlisted personnel under circumstances that are condemned by the
customs of the service. In one case the court said:
By long-standing custom of the service, an officer should not drink
intoxicating liquor with enlisted men or wrongfully fraternize with
them to the extent that the familiarity so induced will affect or prej-
udice good order or military discipline. The basis for the custom
is the preservation of military discipline and is not a question of so-
cial inequality ... .209
In one case an officer took an enlisted man to bachelor quarters,
offered him intoxicating liquor, and invited him to remain overnight as
a guest. A conviction under article 134 was sustained, but in doing so
205. The provision for mandatory dismissal from the service upon conviction of
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman was removed by an amendment on the
floor of the House of Representatives, without discussion, after committees of both
houses had reported the bill to amend the Articles of War with mandatory dismissal
included. S. Res. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REc. 5743 (1949).
206. United States v. Claypool, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 302, 304, 27 C.M.R. 376, 378
(1959). Cf. United States v. Daggett, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 681, 29 C.M.R. 497 (1960), in
which the court said that a false statement during an investigation can be a violation of
article 133 even though an intent to deceive and officiality are not alleged as would
be required for a conviction under article 107.
207. 1969 MANUAL I 126(d).
208. United States v. Goodwin, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 647, 18 C.M.R. 271 (1955).
209. Livingston, 8 C.M.R. 206, 210 (1952), petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 676, 8
C.M.R. 178 (1953).
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the court gave many examples of acceptable situations involving asso-
ciations between officer and enlisted personnel. Each situation must be
considered in the light of whether a reasonably prudent person, experi-
enced in the problems of military leadership, would conclude that good
order and discipline would be prejudiced.
210
The accused's status as an officer was an aggravating circumstance
in several cases under article 134, e.g., the case of an officer who was
found in a compromising situation with the wife of an enlisted man,211
an officer who solicited an enlisted man to go absent without leave,
212
and the exhibition of obscene and lewd motion pictures to military per-
sonnel.213
VII. Some Observations
Critics of the general article have generally complained about its
uncertainty. It cannot be denied that uncertainty exists even though
there are thousands of cases interpreting the article. Several years after
the Uniform Code became effective, a survey revealed that almost one-
third of the reported cases involved at least one offense charged under
the general article, although in most cases the accused were charged with
other misconduct in addition to the article 134 violation.
Presently, there are fifty-five offenses listed in the Table of Maxi-
mum Punishments as violations of the general article, disregarding those
which are subdivided to provide greater punishment for aggravating cir-
cumstances. A punitive discharge is an authorized punishment for
more than 60 percent of these offenses and long prison sentences are
frequently authorized. For example, confinement for up to 20 years is
authorized for assault with intent to commit murder or rape; 10 years is
authorized for various other serious offenses, including burning with
intent to defraud and a number of drug offenses.
With the exception of the obvious clarification that would result
if the Table of Maximum Punishments were to list all forms of assault
under article 128, it is doubtful that the general article could be made
more certain without amending legislation. Nevertheless, this would
seem to be a worthy long-term goal of both the Congress and the Depart-
ment of Defense. Amending legislation would probably add at least
thirty punitive articles to the more than fifty presently in the Uniform
210. Free, 14 C.M.R. 466 (1953).
211. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185, petition denied, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 712, 4 C.M.R. 173 (1952).
212. Jackson, 8 C.M.R. 215 (1952), petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 677, 8 C.M.R.
178 (1953).
213. Cowan, 12 C.M.R. 374 (1953); see United States v. Jewson, 1 U.S.C.M.A.
652, 5 C.M.R. 80 (1952).
Code. This would not be an unreasonable proliferation.
The more serious misconduct for which a punitive discharge is an
authorized punishment should be included in one or more specific
punitive articles. This is certainly preferable to relying on punishing
such conduct only if it is prejudicial to discipline or discreditable to
the service.
A court-martial must be instructed that an element of an offense
charged under article 134, other than a crime or offense not capital, is
prejudicial to military discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon
the Armed Forces. 214 Appellate military tribunals have, upon occasion,
found that conduct which resulted in convictions was not prejudicial to
discipline or discreditable to the service, and have held that no offense
was committed. 5 Yet there is no requirement that there be testimony
of one versed in military matters that, in his opinion, the conduct
charged was either prejudicial to discipline or discreditable to the service.
Perhaps some convictions would not have been reversed if there had
been such testimony.
The third clause should certainly be enacted into a separate article.
"Crimes and offenses not capital" has a very definite meaning, and it
should not be confused with the first two clauses. Rather than using
the traditional wording, however, it would be better simply to provide
that any act or omission which is not punishable under another article of
the Uniform Code, but which is denounced as a crime or offense by the
Congress or under the authority of the Congress, may be tried by court-
martial. This is a paraphrase of the language in which the Manual for
Courts-Martial explains the clause. 216
Conclusion
From a realistic viewpoint it is unlikely that early action can be
expected with respect to the suggested changes included in this discus-
sion. The legislative process is slow. Several years were required to
draft and to enact the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and subsequent
amendments have required more than a year, sometimes several years,
to be passed.
As a personal observation, in reviewing many thousands of cases
involving article 134 and its predecessors, not a single instance has
214. United States v. Darby, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 416, 26 C.M.R. 196 (1958). See
cases cited note 33 supra.
215. See notes 186-88 supra.
216. 1969 MANUAL 213(e).
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been found in which it could be concluded that no one could reason-
ably believe that the conduct charged was not in some way prejudicial
to discipline or discreditable to the service. This is not meant as a criti-
cism of the tribunals which have reversed convictions under the general
article. Many of the convictions were reversed either for technical rea-
sons or because it was held that the conduct did not reach the degree of
wrongfulness that should result in a conviction. It is a tribute to those
who have administered military justice through the years that there has
been no great clamor to remove the vagueness discussed above.

